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Abstract 
Capital requirements for banks must balance a number of factors, including any effects on the 
cost of capital and in turn the rates available to borrowers. Standard theory predicts that, in 
perfect and efficient capital markets, reducing banks’ leverage would reduce the risk and cost of 
their equity but leave the overall weighted average cost of capital unchanged. We test these two 
predictions empirically. We confirm that the equity of better-capitalized banks has both lower 
systematic risk (beta) and lower idiosyncratic risk. However, over the last 40 years in the United 
States, lower risk banks have higher stock returns on a risk-adjusted or even a raw basis, a 
pattern consistent with a stock market anomaly previously documented in other samples. A 
simple calibration using historical data suggests that a ten percentage-point increase in Tier 1 
capital to risk-weighted assets would have increased the weighted average cost of capital by 
between 60 and 90 basis points per year. In competitive lending markets, a change of this 
magnitude would have doubled or tripled spreads, because bank asset betas implied an average 
risk premium of only 40 basis points above Treasury yields over that same period. 
                                                            
1 For helpful comments we thank Yakov Amihud, Jon Bernstein, Robin Greenwood, Alec Guzov, Victoria Ivashina, 
Thomas McGuire, Hamid Mehran, Antony Saunders, David Scharfstein, Amit Seru, Adi Sunderam, Jeremy Stein, 
Robert Turley, seminar participants at Harvard Business School and NYU Stern School of Business, and especially 
Sam Hanson. We thank Alex Guzov and Robert Turley for excellent research assistance. In addition to their 
academic affiliations, Baker and Wurgler serve as consultants to Acadian Asset Management. Baker gratefully 
acknowledges financial support from the Division of Research of the Harvard Business School. 
  1
I. Introduction 
The instability of financial institutions apparent in the financial crisis of 2008 has led to 
calls for increased capital requirements.  The issue is multidimensional, involving agency 
problems in banks, asymmetric information, international coordination, bank governance, tax 
benefits of debt, government subsidies, systemic risks, shadow banking, and so on. But a central 
concern is whether capital requirements affect banks’ overall cost of capital, and therefore 
lending rates and economic activity.2 
Bankers often resist increased capital requirements on the argument that equity is more 
expensive than debt, so more of it raises the overall cost of capital. A former managing director 
of JP Morgan and policy analyst writes, “the first-order effect of increasing the ratio of common 
equity to total assets for banks from 5% to 30% would clearly be very high. Assume that the 
annual cost of bank equity is 5 percentage points higher than the after-tax cost of bank deposits 
and debt. …” (Elliott (2013)). The CEO of Deutsche Bank argues that heightened capital 
requirements “would restrict [banks’] ability to provide loans to the rest of the economy. This 
reduces growth and has negative effects for all” (Admati and Hellwig (2013), p. 5). 
Many economists, on the other hand, view the weighted average cost of capital as more 
or less invariant to capital structure. They consider the argument above a fallacy. Admati, 
DeMarzo, Hellwig, and Pfleiderer (2011) sum up the textbook Modigliani-Miller logic: 
“[B]ecause the increase in capital provides downside protection that reduces shareholders’ risk, 
shareholders will require a lower expected return to invest in a better capitalized bank” (p. 16). 
In an efficient and integrated capital market, absent taxes and other distortions, the reduced cost 
                                                            
2 See Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard (1994), Philippon (2009), Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012) and citations therein 
for evidence on the effect of costs of capital on business investment. Broader studies of the real effects of bank 
capital requirements include Van den Heuvel (2008), Macroeconomic Assessment Group of the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (2010), Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010), Elliott (2009, 2010), and Santos and 
Elliott (2012).   
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of equity offsets its increased weight in the capital structure and leaves the overall cost of capital 
unchanged. Admati and Hellwig (2013) suggest raising the minimum equity to assets ratio to 
between 20% and 30% from its current single digits. But given that real capital markets contain 
frictions and inefficiencies that challenge almost all of the Modigliani-Miller assumptions, the 
validity of the textbook conservation of risk argument is not so clear.3 
In this paper, we attempt to determine how leverage affects the risk and cost of bank 
equity and the overall cost of capital in practice. We are particularly motivated by the potential 
interaction of capital requirements and the “low risk anomaly” within the stock market. While 
stocks have on average earned higher returns than less risky asset classes like corporate bonds, 
which in turn have earned higher returns than Treasury bonds, the risk-return relationship within 
the stock market has historically been flat if not inverted. Haugen and Heins (1975), Fama and 
French (1992), Baker, Bradley, and Wurgler (2011), and Baker, Bradley, and Taliaferro (2013) 
find a flat or negative relationship between a stock’s systematic risk, as measured by its stock 
market beta, and its subsequent returns. Ang, Hodrick, Ying, and Zhang (2006, 2009) find a 
negative relationship between idiosyncratic risk and returns in the U.S. and many international 
stock markets.  
These studies suggest that there is a low risk anomaly on average within the stock market. 
The relevant question for bank capital regulation is whether this holds within banks specifically. 
Does the cost of equity fall with capital requirements as the Modigliani-Miller logic predicts? Or 
does it not fall by enough, or actually increase, as bankers and the low risk anomaly would 
imply? Indeed, the low risk anomaly might not be present in banks at all. Relative to 
                                                            
3 Admati et al., for instance, cite seven theoretical papers in the relevant section but only one empirical paper, 
Kashyap, Stein, and Hanson (2010), which does not estimate the cost of equity directly.  
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nonfinancial firms, their financial structure and risk are tracked in considerably greater detail by 
regulators and investors.  
Our empirical evaluation proceeds in two steps.  First, we relate bank equity betas 
estimated from CRSP to leverage ratios from quarterly reports.  Second, we relate realized 
returns on equity to bank equity betas. We also replace beta with idiosyncratic risk. The two 
steps together then allow us to calibrate the effect of increased capital requirements on the cost of 
equity and, under certain assumptions, the overall cost of capital. 
We confirm that bank equity risk is sharply increasing in leverage. Our work here 
complements and extends that of Kashyap, Stein, and Hanson (2010). When capital is measured 
by the standard Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets ratio, the portfolio beta of the least-
capitalized banks is 0.93 while the portfolio beta of the most-capitalized banks is 0.50. Higher 
capital ratios also predict lower idiosyncratic risk. Even this relatively large difference in beta is 
likely attenuated by two factors. Banks with riskier assets may choose to have larger capital 
cushions. This endogenous selection tends to reduce the slope between capital ratios and beta. 
Indeed, within the largest banks, where the asset mix is more varied, including investment 
banking, asset management, and other operations, the difference is smaller and less robust. Also, 
to the extent that debt is risky, some of the asset risk is borne by debt and not equity for the most 
leveraged banks. This type of risk sharing between debt and equity also flattens the empirical 
relationship. Overall, the first step of the textbook argument holds as expected. 
Does a reduction in beta translate to a reduction in the cost of equity?  The answer 
contained in the most recent 40 years of CRSP stock returns is no. The low risk anomaly is 
actually a bit stronger within banks than within all publicly traded firms. High-beta banks 
returned less than low-beta banks, even on a raw basis, in a period of mostly rising equity 
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markets. Value-weighted returns are on average 16 basis points per month higher for a portfolio 
of the lowest three beta deciles than for a portfolio of the highest three beta deciles. The spread 
between low and high idiosyncratic risk portfolios is 6 basis points per month. These effects do 
not appear to be mediated by capitalization. Controlling for a size factor increases the risk-
adjusted differences, especially for idiosyncratic risk portfolios. More simply, beta is positively 
correlated with capitalization while idiosyncratic risk is negatively correlated, yet both risk types 
are negatively related to average returns.  
We focus on the last 40 years of data because earlier stock returns data includes only a 
small number of banks, rendering portfolio returns much less diversified and conclusions more 
tenuous. Nonetheless, results using the last 80 years of data are at least as strong. The bottom line 
is that high-risk U.S. banks, like high-risk nonfinancial firms in the U.S. and other developed 
markets, have delivered equal or lower returns to shareholders the low-risk U.S. banks.  
To understand the economic significance of the results, we focus on the beta anomaly and 
estimate how the overall cost of capital for a bank would have changed over this period given a 
hypothetical ten percentage-point increase in Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets, the 
experiment considered in Kashyap et al. (2010). A benchmark estimate of the basic weighted 
average cost of capital for a typical bank implied by the Capital Asset Pricing Model over the 
same 40-year period is 40 basis points per year above the risk-free rate. By reducing equity betas, 
banks with a full ten percentage point increase in Tier 1 capital would have added between 60 
and 90 basis points to this spread—more than doubling the weighted average cost of capital over 
the risk-free rate. In a competitive lending market this would have translated to a similar increase 
in average bank lending rates. To the extent that the shadow banking system was not similarly 
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constrained, lending would have moved more rapidly from banks to flexible and less regulated 
parts of the capital market.  
The critical assumption in the simple calibration is that the linear, historical relationship 
between risk and return would have held, as banks were required to shift their risk profile. A less 
important assumption is that bank debt was approximately risk-free. We also consider the 
sensitivity of this calibration to the assumption of risky debt, the extension of a low risk anomaly 
to debt as well as equity markets, and the impact of government insurance of bank debt. We 
conclude that as long as the debt and equity markets were not perfectly integrated—the 
underpinning of Modigliani-Miller logic—the simple calibration with riskless debt remains a 
reasonable estimate.  
In summary, our contribution is to highlight how the low risk anomaly within banks may 
represent an unrecognized and possibly substantial downside of heightened capital requirements. 
It is separate from and additive to the increase in the cost of capital and lending rates through a 
smaller debt tax shield. Kashyap et al. (2010) estimate the other effects of a ten percentage-point 
increase in capital requirements to be 25 to 45 basis points. We emphasize, however, that despite 
the fact that tightened capital requirements may considerably increase the cost of capital and 
lending rates, with adverse implications for investment and growth, they may well remain 
desirable when all other private and social benefits and costs are tallied up. 
Section II gives some background on the low risk anomaly.  Section III describes stock 
returns and capital adequacy data.  Section IV contains the main results on the connections 
between beta, capital levels, and costs of equity.  Section V summarizes recent regulatory trends 
and performs a calibration exercise. Section VI concludes.  
 
  6
II. The Low Risk Anomaly 
Over the long run, riskier asset classes have earned higher returns in U.S. markets. From 
1926 to 2012, small capitalization stocks provided higher but more variable returns than large 
capitalization stocks, which in turn were riskier and returned more than long-term corporate 
bonds, and so on down the list of increasingly safer asset classes of long-term Treasury bonds, 
intermediate-term Treasury bonds, and Treasury bills (Ibbotson Associates (2012)).  
More relevant to our study is that the historical risk-return tradeoff within the stock 
market is flat or inverted. The standard Sharpe-Lintner Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
predicts that the expected return on a security is proportional to its systematic risk (beta). 
Investors are assumed to diversify away idiosyncratic risk so it does not affect their required 
returns. The “low risk anomaly” is the empirical pattern that stocks with higher beta, or higher 
idiosyncratic risk, have tended to earn lower returns.  
To a greater or lesser extent, this failure of the traditional risk-return tradeoff appears in 
stock markets around the world.  Black (1972), Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972), Haugen and 
Heins (1975), and Fama and French (1992) all noted the relatively flat relationship between 
expected returns and beta risk.  The more recent work of Ang, Hodrick, Ying, and Zhang (2006, 
2009) has emphasized the magnitude and robustness of the anomaly. Ang et al. (2009) find that 
stocks with higher idiosyncratic risk earn statistically significantly lower returns in each of the 
G7 countries and across 23 developed markets.  Blitz and van Vliet (2007) and Baker, Bradley, 
and Taliaferro (2013) confirm the low risk anomaly within developed markets and Blitz, Pang, 
and van Vliet (2012) extend this to emerging markets, where it appears to be growing over time.  
These patterns challenge not just the CAPM but also any asset-pricing framework where risk and 
return are positively related.  
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The magnitude of the risk-return inversion is large.  For example, Baker, Bradley, and 
Taliaferro (2013) find that a dollar invested in a low quintile beta portfolio of U.S. stocks in early 
1968 grows to $70.50 by the end of 2011, a while dollar invested in a high beta portfolio grows 
to only $7.61. In a sample of up to 30 developed equity markets over a shorter period beginning 
in 1989, the comparable figures are $6.40 and $0.99.  It is remarkable that a value-weighted 
portfolio of high-risk quintile stocks held for four decades did not earn the investor a positive 
return in nominal terms.  
Several explanations for the low risk anomaly have been put forth.  A variety of evidence 
suggests that some individual investors have an irrational preference for volatile or skewed 
investments, due to overconfidence, as in Cornell (2008), or lottery preferences, as in Kumar 
(2009), Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011) and the cumulative prospect theory of Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992) as modeled by Barberis and Huang (2008). Leverage-constrained investors 
who pursue a strategy of seeking high returns from beta risk must invest in high-beta stocks 
directly, leading them to be overpriced relative to a leveraged position in low-beta stocks (Black 
(1972) and Frazzini and Pedersen (2013)).  
One question is why more sophisticated investors do not take advantage of the anomaly.  
Institutional fund managers may prefer high-beta assets themselves because the inflows to 
performing well are greater than the outflows to performing poorly (Karceski (2002)). Another 
reason for a high-beta preference is when managers are rewarded for beating the market, which 
presumably has a positive risk premium, on a non-beta-adjusted basis (Brennan (1993) and 
Baker et al. (2011)). More generally, short-selling constraints inhibit sophisticated investors’ 
ability to exploit the overpricing of high-beta stocks (Hong and Sraer (2012)).  
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For our purposes, the precise origin of the low risk anomaly is not critical. What matters 
is whether it exists among banks and, if so, is likely to persist. Given that overconfidence and 
lottery preferences are intrinsic human attributes; that leverage and short-sale constraints are 
enduring features of the trading environment; that institutional investors and their incentives are 
only becoming more important over time; and that the low risk anomaly apparent within all-
industry samples appears in long U.S. and international samples—it seems reasonable to 
maintain that any low risk anomaly present within banks would persist.  
The low risk anomaly has parallel implications for investors and CFOs. Low risk stocks, 
at least with the benefit of high returns in hindsight, have been priced cheaply on average. So, 
raising equity capital for these firms has been comparatively expensive. High risk stocks, by 
contrast, have been expensive, and the cost of raising equity for these firms has been 
comparatively low. One might well ask why operating firms have not increased their leverage 
ratios more to take advantage of the low risk anomaly. It is hard to square the low leverage ratios 
of nonfinancial firms simply with a tradeoff between the tax benefits of interest and the costs of 
financial distress, much less an extra benefit of debt arising from the mispricing of low risk 
stocks.4 It is worth noting that many of these low leverage firms—think of the stereotypical 
profitable technology firm—start with a high asset beta or overall asset risk. For our purposes, it 
is simple enough to say that there is no low leverage puzzle within banks.  
Banks in particular tend to rely largely on debt to finance their lending operations and 
generally start with a very low asset beta. This means that without significant leverage their 
equity might in many cases resemble investment grade debt in terms of risk. This puts another 
lens on the low risk anomaly, and suggests a possible remedy to the mispricing that could arise 
                                                            
4 See Graham (2000) on the low leverage puzzle. The low risk anomaly suggests another source of profits from 
leveraged buyouts, if the equity of a low-leverage firm is made more valuable by increasing its risk.   
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from significantly heightened capital requirements. It is perhaps that the mere categorization of a 
security as equity leads investors to demand a return that resembles the return on other stocks, 
regardless of its particular risk properties. Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2009) argue that such 
investor behavior influenced the pricing of highly rated collateralized debt obligations. This 
suggests a marketing effort, albeit perhaps an unrealistic one, would be required to help investors 
differentiate low leverage bank equity from similarly labeled equity in industrial firms. 
But before making any policy prescriptions, we ask whether the combination of an 
exogenous increase in capital requirements and the low risk anomaly would increase the overall 
cost of capital for banks.  The first step is to ask whether heightened capital requirements would 
reduce equity risk for banks.  The second is to ask whether the low risk anomaly holds within 
banks such that the increase in equity would raise the cost of capital. In general, we focus on beta 
risk, where the Modigliani-Miller logic best applies, but we also explore idiosyncratic risk.   
 
III. Data 
A. Banks, Betas, and Returns 
Estimating the relationship between expected equity returns—alternatively, the required 
return on equity or the cost of equity—and beta requires both a long time series of returns and a 
large number of banks to provide breadth in beta.  Our main sample for the returns analysis 
includes almost 4,000 publicly traded banks or bank holding companies that make an appearance 
in over 40 years of returns data, for a total of more than a quarter of a million bank-months of 
returns.  
We gather bank stock prices and returns data from January 1931 through December 2011 
from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) database.  We focus our attention on 
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the second half of the sample, the most recent 40.5 years starting in July 1971. We save the full 
sample as a robustness check, because there are relatively few publicly traded banks in the early 
CRSP years, rendering the beta portfolios undiversified and highly volatile.5  We identify banks 
using the set of four-digit SIC codes suggested in Fama and French (1997) plus the three-digit 
SIC code corresponding to bank holding companies.6 The primary sample includes bank-months 
for which we can compute a valid beta, with at least 24 monthly holding period return (CRSP: 
RET) observations, a valid market capitalization, with a nonmissing price (PRC) and shares 
outstanding (SHROUT) observation, and at least one holding period return following a valid 
beta.  Due to the return requirements, the bank-months we follow run from February 1970 
through December 2011.  
The primary sample of banks is broken down by decade and SIC in Table 1.  Holding 
companies are the most numerous group, followed by savings institutions, commercial banks, 
state banks in the Federal Reserve System, national commercial banks, S&Ls, and national banks 
in the Federal Reserve System. A total of 3,952 banks make an appearance over the course of our 
CRSP sample.  
Summary statistics for this sample are in Table 2.  The bank-month observations are 
divided by pre-ranking risk measures.  Pre-ranking beta is computed for each bank-month by 
regressing a minimum of 24 months and a maximum of 60 months of trailing holding period 
returns in excess of the riskless rate on the corresponding CRSP U.S. value-weighted market 
holding period returns (CRSP: VWRETD, also in excess of the riskless rate, and provided by 
                                                            
5 After July 1971, there are at least 70 firms in the sample. Prior to July 1971, there are between five and 69 banks, 
with an overall average of 22.  
6 We exclude a small number of firms included in Fama and French’s definition of banks: those with SIC 
classifications as Federal Reserve Banks, Foreign Banks, Functions Related to Deposit Banking, Nondepository 
Credit Institutions, Federal Credit Agencies, or FNMA. Including these firms has no effect on our results.  
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Ken French). We also take the root mean squared error from these regressions as our measure of 
idiosyncratic risk. This pre-ranking beta is what we will use to rank banks when tracking 
subsequent returns.  We will consider forward (realized) betas and idiosyncratic risk as well 
when correlating beta and capital ratios.  
It is worth noting at the outset that bank betas on an equal weighted basis are relatively 
low. The overall median is only 0.67. There is also ample spread on pre-ranking equity beta 
among our bank sample. The mean pre-ranking beta among the bottom three deciles is 0.18 and 
the mean among the top three deciles is 1.37. More importantly, we will see that this pre-ranking 
spread leads to differences in realized portfolio betas of approximately 0.6. Another important 
pattern from Table 2 is the correlations between risk measures and capitalization. Beta is higher 
for large banks, while idiosyncratic risk is lower. As we shall also see, the risk measures imply 
similar conclusions for leverage and returns, suggesting that the results are not being mediated 
by capitalization.  
In total, this broad sample contains up to 272,031 bank-months for our beta and returns 
analysis. We also use three control variables common in the analysis of the cross-section of stock 
returns; e.g. Fama and French (1992) and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). As suggested above, 
higher-beta banks tend to be larger market capitalization.  This is the opposite of the negative 
correlation between beta and market capitalization among nonfinancial firms. Bank holding 
companies may have units such as investment banking where profits are more correlated with the 
overall stock market. Also, smaller firms, with less geographic and product diversification, may 
choose less risky operations with endogenously higher capital. To the extent that the endogenous 
link is through idiosyncratic risks, not beta, this is a useful form of identification for us.  
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We also compute book-to-market equity ratios. Book equity data are available for a 
subset of stocks from Compustat, sourced from Moody’s. We follow the definition of book 
equity from Ken French’s data library. Within each beta group there is skewness in book-to-
market; it will come as no surprise that some banks have seen the market value of their assets 
deteriorate faster than they were marked down.  The median ratio across beta groups is an 
identical 0.76.  Another control variable is return momentum, defined as usual as the total stock 
return over the prior twelve months excluding the most recent one.  
Figure 1 shows the time series of the average betas in each quantile.  In an average year 
there is a spread of around 1.0 between the average beta in the top three deciles and the bottom 
three deciles.  The average CRSP market return over the riskless rate is 6% and the standard 
deviation is 18% over our sample period, suggesting meaningful dispersion in CAPM-based 
expected equity returns and very wide dispersion in market-driven realized returns.  There is a 
jump in the number of smaller banks in 1973, when Nasdaq-listed firms first appear in the CRSP 
database.  This influx of typically lower-beta banks brings down average betas significantly in 
the early years, to a range and spread that has remained somewhat stable since the mid-1970s.  
 
B. Bank Capital 
We are able to gather capitalization data for a subset of the CRSP sample from the 
quarterly call reports data in the WRDS Bank Regulatory database.  We use the CRSP PERMCO 
to bank RSSID ID link table available from March 1996 through December 2010 that is provided 
by WRDS; we start at 1996 with the introduction of granular capital data. In cases of multiple 
RSSIDs per PERMCO, we aggregate RCFD data items across RSSIDs. An alternative approach 
that yields similar results (unreported) is to use the quarterly Compustat data items on capital 
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adequacy for banks. Our overall coverage is slightly better using the aggregation of call reports. 
Finally, we merge CRSP PERMCOs to PERMNOs. 
We consider five common capital ratios to determine which measure of equity best lines 
up with equity beta. The ratio of total equity capital (RCFD3210) divided by average total assets 
(RCFD3368) is the simple shareholder equity ratio.  Tier 1 capital (RCFD8274, which is first 
available in March 1996) to average total assets is called the leverage ratio.  Total risk-based 
capital (RCFD3792) to assets puts the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital in the numerator. Tier 1 
capital to total risk-weighted assets (RCFDa223) is the widely followed Tier 1 capital ratio.  
Total risk-based capital to total risk-weighted assets is called the total capital ratio.  Scaling by 
risk-weighted assets is an effort to address the possibility that asset beta may differ somewhat 
across our sample.  
We distribute these quarterly capital data across relevant months to yield an intersection 
of 74,105 bank-months with the basic returns data set.  Table 3, Panel A, shows the distribution 
of these measures of bank capital.  The sample is divided each month into ten deciles of capital 
adequacy.  We report the median and market-capitalization weighted mean ratio within each 
decile.  In this somewhat heterogeneous sample of banking institutions, the average capital ratios 
in the highest decile are typically around twice those of the lowest decile. The highest spread 
appears in the ratio Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets, which over this period was widely 
regarded as the most important measure of capital by market participants. 
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IV. Analysis 
A. Predictions: Capital Adequacy, Beta, and Returns 
 In efficient capital markets, higher capital ratios will be associated with lower equity 
betas and lower equity returns, all else equal.  Capital structure is endogenous, however, so we 
cannot use the cross-sectional relationship between capital ratios and beta to measure the causal 
effect of an increase in capital requirements.  These effects tend to attenuate the relationship 
between capital ratios and equity beta. So, if there is a meaningful difference between 
endogenously selected capital ratios and empirical equity betas, we can be comfortable that 
exogenous effects would be at least as large.  
 Figure 2 shows some basic predictions for how leverage affects equity betas.  Writing the 
definition of asset beta as a weighted average of equity and debt betas, with e being the ratio of 
equity to total assets and the inverse of e leverage, and rearranging, yields 
  deaee  111  . (1) 
With approximately riskless debt, the last term drops out and the relationship between equity 
beta and leverage is linear with a slope of asset beta, as shown with the solid line in Figure 2.7  
The effect of risky debt is apparent at high leverage, where debt’s beta rises and causes equity’s 
beta to rise less than linearly, as indicated by the dashed line on the right-hand side of Figure 2.  
 When banks differ in their asset betas, endogenous leverage choice due to financial 
distress costs leads to an additional effect that flattens the predicted relationship between equity 
beta and leverage.  Banks with high asset betas, and therefore high equity betas for any given 
leverage, will tend to choose lower leverage.  Similarly, and reinforcing the risky debt effect, 
                                                            
7 It is worth a reminder that the weighted average of equity and debt betas equals asset beta by identity, in the same 
way that the beta of any portfolio is the weighted sum of the betas in the portfolio.  The CAPM is not required for its 
validity. Also note that a debt tax shield do not alter this formula as long as the bank continuously rebalances its debt 
to maintain a constant debt to value ratio; the tax shield asset is as risky as the operating assets. 
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banks with low asset betas, and thus low equity betas for any given leverage, may choose higher 
leverage.  To summarize, the dashed line in Figure 2 is what we would expect from this real-
world combination of risky debt and endogenous capital structure choice. The coefficient in a 
regression of equity betas on inverse capital ratios is likely to be somewhat lower than the asset 
beta, particularly for extreme levels of leverage. 
 This discussion also suggests why we want to go from capital adequacy to returns in two 
steps—from capital to beta, and from beta to returns—as opposed to directly from capital to 
returns.  As explained above, capital is endogenous in a way that may attenuate the results we are 
looking for: High capital firms tend to have riskier assets to start with.  Critically, however, this 
endogenous selection of capital will be apparent in betas, i.e. an attenuated link between capital 
and beta.  From a regulatory perspective we wish to understand the effect of an exogenous 
increase in capital requirements.  In that case, beta will fall, and then we can use the beta effects 
to infer the ultimate effects of higher capital. The capital data therefore is in place to estimate a 
reasonable lower bound for the link between capital requirements and beta, and then we can use 
the returns data to get at the link between beta and returns.8  
 
B. Capital Adequacy and Beta 
 The channel that we are interested in is how equity affects beta.  Table 3, Panel B, shows 
the relationship between capital measures and realized beta.  The equal-weighted columns 
indicate that across all banks and for all capital measures, higher capital is associated with lower 
beta.  We highlight the popular Tier 1 ratio, which generates the largest spread on beta as well as 
on capital.  It is not surprising that the pure equity in the Tier 1 ratio (despite including some 
                                                            
8 A more practical constraint is that fifteen years of capital data are not enough for sufficiently reliable estimates of 
average returns on different risk categories of banks.  
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preferred equity) spreads beta better than other measures.  Subordinated debt of the sort that is 
included in Tier 2, for example, provides a broader notion of capital but cannot reduce the beta 
of equity by nearly as much as more equity.  Kashyap et al. (2010) focus on larger banks and use 
Computstat data on bank equity, and they document a relationship between beta and total equity 
to total assets.  The more detailed breakdown afforded by the use of call reports data suggests 
that Tier 1 equity is by far the most important for spreading beta.   
The value-weighted differences in Panel B show that the link between beta and capital 
adequacy ratios is weaker for larger banks. It is precisely in these banks where one would expect 
the endogenous selection of leverage to be apparent, because the asset mix is much more 
variable. For example a bank with a high capital ratio might nonetheless have a high beta, 
because it derives more profit from higher beta activities like investment banking and brokerage. 
Still, the difference in realized beta as a function of the Tier 1 ratio is statistically and 
economically meaningful even in value-weighted terms. 
The significant spread in capital ratios suggests that some banks may not face binding 
leverage constraints, but this is misleading. We review actual regulatory requirements in the 
calibration, but note here that falling below regulatory minima subjects U.S. banks to Prompt 
Corrective Action restrictions, including ceasing dividends, filing and implementing a capital 
restoration plan, and prohibiting acceptance, renewal, or rolling-over of broker CDs. It may also 
force a return to the equity markets with an obvious lemons problem. Even falling below the 
higher standard of “well capitalized” triggers an increase in deposit insurance premia. Given the 
consequences of falling short, the overwhelming majority of banks maintain a sizable buffer over 
the well-capitalized boundary, not just the regulatory minimum. The precise buffer presumably 
varies with asset risk, perceived access to the equity market, capital structure adjustment costs, 
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and other factors. In short, it is difficult to know whether bank leverage responds fully one-for-
one with capital requirements, but they influence even banks that are already well above 
heightened regulatory percentages.9  
To obtain a precise estimate of the linear relationship between forward (realized) beta and 
equity capital we can go beyond decile sorts.  For idiosyncratic risk in particular, which cancels 
out in portfolios, we must look at the full cross section of beta and root mean squared error 
measured at the stock level. Table 4 shows regression results of forward beta and idiosyncratic 
risk on inverse equity capital, the specification suggested by equation (1), for all banks.  We use 
the Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedure, which gives equal weight to each cross section, in the 
estimation, and we also use two-dimensional clustering, which corrects the standard errors of a 
single regression for correlated residuals for different time periods for the same firm or for 
different firms at a point in time. Figure 3 shows a third approach to tease out some of the 
nonlinear effects in Figure 2. These are kernel regressions of the same relationship for all banks 
and for banks only in the top half by market capitalization.  
Recall the discussion of the predictions in Figure 2. If variation in leverage were 
exogenous and debt were riskless, we would expect the slope in a regression of equity betas on 
inverse capital ratios to equal the average bank asset beta, and we would expect the intercept to 
be exactly zero. Both endogenous leverage choices and measurement error in capital cause the 
slope to be attenuated and the intercept to be positive. Consistent with measurement error, we 
find lower slopes for cruder measures of assets and equity capital. Consistent with the presence 
of endogenous leverage choices, the intercept is somewhat greater than zero even for the Tier 1 
to risk-weighted assets ratio and there is attenuation in the slope in Figure 3 for very low levels 
                                                            
9 We are grateful to Sam Hanson for the discussion in this paragraph.  
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of leverage. A rough correction is to run this regression while forcing the intercept to be zero. 
This raises the lower bound estimate for asset beta to 0.074, which is the measured slope of the 
line in Panel A of Figure 3.  
This will be convenient for benchmarking in our calibration below. If bank assets have an 
inherent beta of 0.074 and the CAPM holds in frictionless capital markets, the pre-tax weighted 
average cost of capital for banks should have exceeded the risk free rate by 0.074 times the 
market risk premium, or approximately 40 basis points annually (= 45 x 12 x 0.074) using the 
market risk premium from Ken French’s data library of 45 basis points per month from July 
1971 through December 2011.  This matches the estimation period that we will use below and 
roughly corresponds to the approach in Damadoran (2012).10 For the full CRSP history and the 
same asset beta, the corresponding figure was 57 basis points annually. 
In results available upon request, we confirm the relationships between capital and future 
beta using Compustat’s reported Tier 1 capital ratio (CAPR1Q) and total risk-based capital ratio 
(CAPR3Q). The slope coefficients and explanatory power are slightly lower in the Compustat 
data, suggesting that the call reports data is slightly more accurate.  
Finally, the bottom panels of Table 4 show that greater capital is also associated with 
higher idiosyncratic risk, at least for capital measures scaled by risk-weighted assets. The 
strongest relationship is between idiosyncratic risk and total risk-based capital to risk-weighted 
assets, which, like Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets, also spreads beta well. Overall, capital 
ratios are somewhat more tightly linked to beta than to idiosyncratic risk.  
 
  
                                                            
10 Damodaran’s approach is simple, but it is easy to find higher or lower estimates based on other methodologies or 
samples. The equity premium “puzzle” literature regards the historical premium as too high to be explained with 
standard intertemporal models (Mehra and Prescott (1985)). See Mehra (2008) for an overview. 
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C.  The Low Risk Anomaly Within Banks 
The data clearly show that raising capital requirements would reduce the equity beta of 
banks.  This is consistent with the textbook Modigliani-Miller argument and essentially 
mechanical.  The next question is whether this can be expected to reduce the cost of equity, as 
theory also predicts. Here the theory is not quite as strong, because it relies on the efficient 
pricing of CAPM risks across banks. The empirical alternative is that there is a low risk anomaly 
in banks, just as there has been in nonfinancial firms. 
Table 5 runs cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth regressions of monthly returns on beta 
deciles.  Under the CAPM, the coefficient on beta should reveal the market risk premium.  
Because of measurement error and skewness in beta, book-to-market, and momentum, we run 
these regressions using deciles instead of raw values. Because we are using beta deciles, not beta 
per se, an approximate relationship to keep in mind is from Table 2, which suggests that a 
movement of about seven deciles corresponds to an increase in pre-ranking beta of 1.2 and a 
difference in realized portfolio betas shown below of approximately 0.6. 
In the univariate regression of returns on beta decile alone, however, the point estimate is 
actually negative.  Adjusting the point estimate to be in units of beta thus does not help us get to 
a plausible market risk premium.  In the multivariate regression where we make the conservative 
assumption that size, book-to-market, and return momentum are risk factors that need to be 
controlled for, we also fail to find any meaningful relationship between beta and returns.  For 
example, adjusting the point estimate to be in units of realized beta implies an implausibly small 
market risk premium of around 1% per year.  This is far lower than realized market returns over 
the same or longer periods, not to mention that the difference is statistically indistinguishable 
from zero.  
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In Table 6, we follow beta-sorted portfolios, and once again find no evidence of a 
positive relationship between beta and returns.  As in Table 2, we divide stocks into three groups 
according to pre-ranking beta. Sorting stocks leads to a reliable difference in realized portfolio 
betas. The low beta, value-weighted portfolio has a realized beta of 0.71 and the high beta 
portfolio has a beta almost twice as high at 1.27. These differences in risk should in theory lead 
to higher average returns over a period when equity returns overall were positive. Yet, the 
monthly returns in excess of the riskless rate are actually 16 basis points per month higher for the 
lowest beta group than for the highest beta group.  Risk-adjusted underperformance is 
mechanically much greater.  For a basic market model, the underperformance rises to 41 basis 
points per month.  For a Fama-French three-factor model, the underperformance rises further to 
46 basis points per month. Equal weighting stocks within each portfolio does not alter these 
impressions. The raw return differences are smaller at 0.9 basis points, and the comparable risk-
adjusted figures are 28 and 47 basis points per month.  
While these risk-adjusted differences are economically large and statistically significant 
at conventional levels, the t-stats are not overwhelming. Plotting the time series in Figure 4 
reveals why. There are periods where low beta stocks underperform, most notably in the late 
1990s and in nonfinancial stocks, when risky stocks of all types outperformed low risk stocks. 
One can either view this as a brief confirmation of the CAPM or an exceptional bubble which, 
when removed, strengthens the conclusions of a low volatility anomaly elsewhere. 
The simplest evidence that the low risk anomaly holds within banks is in the cumulative 
returns in Figure 4.  High-beta banks underperform on a raw basis.  Note that this is true over a 
42-year sample—there is no suggestion that the underperformance of high beta banks can be 
attributed to a crisis period.  Moreover, and not surprisingly, the shareholder who held high beta 
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banks also experienced greater volatility.  To summarize, the low risk anomaly holds within 
banks: for banks, lower beta has historically been associated with equal or higher, not lower, 
costs of equity. 
Turning to idiosyncratic risk in Table 7 shows that the second side of the low risk 
anomaly also holds in banks. Here, the results are stronger in equal weighted portfolios. High 
idiosyncratic risk underperformed low idiosyncratic risk by 28 basis points per month in raw 
terms, 46 basis points per month in beta-adjusted returns, and 76 basis points per month in Fama-
French three-factor model adjusted returns. Qualitatively similar but quantitatively smaller 
patterns obtain for value-weighted portfolios. Examining idiosyncratic returns has an important 
side benefit. As mentioned earlier, large banks have higher beta but lower idiosyncratic risk. The 
fact that the returns (and leverage) results are similar for both measures suggests that the 
conclusions apply both to large and small banks. It also suggests the interpretation that the three-
factor results are statistically stronger precisely because they remove extra random variation that 
arises from the exposure to the Fama-French size factor, isolating the low risk anomaly from the 
size anomaly. 
A final set of robustness checks appears in Table 8, where we extend the sample back to 
1931 for beta-sorted portfolios and idiosyncratic risk sorted portfolios, and we show results for 
the full sample of CRSP stocks. The important things to note are that the low risk anomaly is as 
large economically in the full sample as in the most recent 40 years, and that results within 
banking stocks alone are consistent with the low risk anomaly found in earlier research using the 
entire CRSP sample. 
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V. Calibration 
We now explore the quantitative effects of a hypothetical shift in capital requirements on 
the spread between banks’ weighted average cost of capital and the riskless rate. We first review 
the current regulatory environment to provide some context. We then proceed in three steps. 
First, we consider the simple case where there is a low risk anomaly in equities, but banks are 
otherwise able to raise risk-free and correctly priced debt. We also relax the assumption of risk-
free debt, but retain the assumption of efficiency in the debt market. Second, we layer on the 
possibility of a low risk anomaly for debt as well as equity securities. Third, we briefly consider 
the effects of a government guarantee on bank debt.  
 
A. Regulatory Background 
Bank capital regulations continue to evolve both in the United States and worldwide. 
While countries have differed in the speed of reforms and their implementation details, the broad 
international trend has been toward increased capital requirements. Basel I, agreed in 1988, 
defined Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital as well as risk-weighted assets, and required a minimum of Tier 
1 capital to risk-weighted assets of 4% and a total of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital of 8% (ratios here 
and below are also scaled by risk-weighted assets unless otherwise specified).  Basel II, agreed in 
2006, attempted to address deficiencies of Basel I by modifying the risk-weighting scheme and 
introducing a 2% requirement of common-only Tier 1 capital. Basel III, developed in 2011, 
further revised the definitions of risk-weighted assets, raised the required common Tier 1 ratio to 
between 7% to 9.5% depending on market conditions, raised the required Tier 1 ratio to between 
8.5% to 11%, and raised the total capital requirement to between 10.5% and 13%.  As a 
backstop, Basel III also introduces a minimal requirement of 3% leverage ratio, defined as Tier 1 
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capital to total (non-risk weighted) assets. (The U.S. Federal Reserve had long maintained a 
minimal leverage ratio requirement of 4%.) The U.S. Federal Reserve intends to transition to 
essentially the Basel III rules in phases, with full implementation now expected in 2019.11  
Such regulations are the outcome of interactions among regulators, politicians, investors, 
and bankers, each with somewhat different preferences and proposals, some of which would 
raise the common Tier 1 ratio all the way up to 30% (Elliott (2013)).  Accordingly, we follow 
Kashyap et al. (2010) and assume that regulators impose a 10% increase of capital requirements 
in the form of common equity.  We assume that this is a fully binding and immediate increase 
from current levels. But it might, very roughly speaking, be viewed as the difference between a 
benchmark with no capital requirements and the current regime.  We emphasize that we do not 
estimate the effect of any specific reform proposal, but our hypothetical change is nonetheless in 
an empirically relevant range in light of various policy proposals. 
We focus on capital requirements in this paper, but it is worth noting that liquidity 
requirements of the sort called for in Basel III may also activate the low risk anomaly. Holding 
cash or highly liquid instruments reduces asset beta and overall risk, thus equity beta and 
idiosyncratic risk, which may then increase the cost of bank equity.  
 
B. The Effect of Increased Capital Requirements on the Weighted Average Cost of Capital  
We start by supposing that the CAPM holds, but with a low risk anomaly. In other words, 
higher beta equities underperform their CAPM benchmark and lower beta equities outperform 
their CAPM benchmark. In particular, returns are assumed to take the following linear form: 
ri  i 1   rf irp , (2) 
                                                            
11 See Saunders and Cornett (2010) and Yang (2012) for details on the recent history of banking regulation. 
  24
where i  is the   of any equity i, rf is the risk free rate, rp is the market risk premium, and 
0  dd  measures the extent of the low risk anomaly. Note that Baker et al. (2011) derive a 
pricing equation of exactly this form when investment is delegated to an investment manager 
with a typical information-ratio objective.  (That is, to maximize the return on the portfolio in 
excess of a benchmark divided by the standard deviation of the portfolio return over the 
benchmark.) Also assume that debt is correctly priced by the CAPM at: 
ri  rf drp . (3) 
We relax this assumption in an extension below. 
The cost of capital for a bank is the weighted average of the cost of debt rd and the cost of 
equity re: 
  de reerWACC  1 , (4) 
where e is the ratio of equity to total assets. We can then substitute equation (2) and equation (3) 
into equation (4), and simplify:  
  pafe rreWACC   1 , (5) 
where a  is the   of the banks’ operating assets which we assume is invariant to its capital 
structure. 
We are interested in how the cost of capital changes with a change in capital 
requirements that moves the bank from its old level of capital e to a new regulatory level e*. 
Differencing equation (5), evaluated at the new and old levels of capital, and substituting out the 
equity beta, leads to the following increase in the cost of capital: 
           ***** ,1111 ** eeAeeeeeeeeWACC ddee   . (6) 
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A special case is when the debt is riskless, in both capital regimes, so that 0*  dd  . This 
means that the change in the cost of capital is simply  *ee  , which is greater than zero for 
increases in the ratio of equity e. In general, we believe that the effects of changing debt betas are 
likely to be small. Given that bank equity betas are somewhat less than 1.0 on average, and 
equity ratios are in the range of 8 to 19 percent in Table 3, estimates of a  for banks are quite 
small, estimates of d  are by definition smaller, and differences in d  are smaller still. Even so, 
this simplified measure of the change in the cost of capital under the assumption of riskless debt 
should be viewed as an upper bound. The term A(e,e*) is greater than zero when e > e*. When 
debt shares the asset risk with equity, the impact of an increase in capital requirements on equity 
betas is mitigated somewhat. 
We can use Table 4 to get a rough sense of the size of  dd . In Figure 5 Panel A, we 
plot the estimated alphas and betas from Table 6, separately for CAPM and Fama-French three 
factor regressions. The CAPM betas range from 0.56 for an equal-weighted portfolio of low beta 
banks to 1.27 for a value-weighted portfolio of high beta banks. The corresponding three factor 
betas range from 0.55 to 1.32. The portfolio alphas range from -48 basis points per month for the 
value-weighted portfolio of high beta banks, controlling for the size and book-to-market factors, 
to 34 basis points per month for the equal-weighted portfolio of low beta banks, controlling only 
for the market factor. The figure shows simple regressions of alpha on beta for the two sets of 
portfolio alphas and betas. The historical slope estimates of  are -68 and -75 basis points 
per month.  
Assuming riskless debt, this assumed linear relationship between beta and alpha indicates 
that a 10 percentage point increase in required equity capital would be associated with an 82 (= 
  dd
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68 x 12 x 0.1) to 90 basis point increase in the weighted average cost of capital, and, assuming 
competitive lending markets, a corresponding increase in spreads.   
As a robustness test, Panel B plots the analogous results from Table 6-style regressions 
that exclude two prominent crisis periods, October 1989 through October 1990 and January 2007 
through February 2009. It is not the case that the underperformance of high-beta banks is due to 
exceptionally poor performance during crises, and the anomaly is roughly linear whether one 
includes or excludes such periods.  
Finally, in Figure 6 we substitute the data from Table 6 with comparable estimates using 
the entire CRSP universe of financial and nonfinancial firms. If anything, the low risk anomaly is 
actually stronger in banks than nonfinancial firms. Using the linear, all-CRSP slope estimates, a 
10 percentage point increase in required equity capital is associated with a weighted average cost 
of capital increase of 61 to 65 basis points. So, the range of estimates using a linear empirical 
model of only banking stocks or all US stocks and using a simple CAPM or a three-factor model, 
is from 60 to 90 basis points. 
 
C. Extension 1: Adding a Low Risk Anomaly for Debt 
The calibration is greatly simplified with the assumption of fairly priced and riskless 
debt. The important assumption, though, is not that debt is riskless but that the debt and equity 
markets are not efficiently integrated. If the two markets are integrated and a single equation (2) 
governs the pricing of debt and equity, then the Modigliani and Miller theorem is restored and 
the cost of capital for banks is simply equal to: 
WACC  a 1   rf  arp , (7) 
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which is independent of the chosen capital structure e. Given the magnitude of the low risk 
anomaly within equity markets, this sort of debt market integration suggests an implausibly large 
expected return on debt. An investment grade debt security, say with a beta equal to 0.1, would 
have an expected alpha of 0.9 x 68 = 61 to 0.9 x 75 = 68 basis points per month according to 
equation (2) and Figure 5, and all debt securities, with  s well below 1, would offer large, risk-
adjusted expected returns. Spreads on corporate debt are smaller than this by an order of 
magnitude, so integrated markets of this sort are not likely to be empirically relevant. 
More plausible is a low risk anomaly that holds within each asset class, along the lines of 
Frazzini and Pedersen (2013), but not across asset classes. Baker, Bradley, and Wurgler (2012) 
emphasize that an upward sloping risk and return relationship holds at the level of asset classes, 
ranging from government securities to small cap stocks. This means equation (3) could be 
modified as follows: 
  pdfdddd rrr   , (8) 
where it is the difference of an individual debt security’s d  from the average of all debt 
securities (not 1) that determines the extent of mispricing. Now the overall cost of capital equals: 
     pafddde rreeWACC   11 . (9) 
The analogue of equation (6), the change in the cost of capital as leverage changes, is: 
             ddddd eeAeeeeeeAeeAeeWACC   ****** ,,, . (10) 
An analytically simple special case is when the extent of the low risk anomaly per unit change in 
  is the same within each asset class, so that d  . This means that the change in the cost of 
capital is simply   dee   1* , which is greater than zero for increases in the ratio of equity e.  
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The terms that depend on the change in the debt beta drop out, because there are exactly 
offsetting effects. On the one hand, the debt becomes safer, sharing some of the risk reduction in 
equity as leverage decreases and thus mitigating the increase in the cost of equity. This is the 
impact shown within the first term of equation (10), multiplied by  , and it arises because the 
equity beta falls less than linearly in the inverse of the leverage ratio, and the cost of capital rises 
by less than in the case of riskless debt. On the other hand, because there is less of the now safer, 
lower  , debt, the cost of capital rises by more than in the case of riskless debt. Because of the 
low risk anomaly within the debt markets, safer debt is more expensive on a risk-adjusted basis. 
These two effects offset exactly, when the extent of the low risk anomaly is the same within the 
two asset classes. When the low risk anomaly is smaller in debt markets, the effect of changing 
debt betas on mitigating the rise in the cost of equity is larger, so that an increase in capital 
increases the cost of capital by less than in the case where d   and the simplified expression 
is an upper bound effect. 
The simplified expression   dee   1*  contains an extra term added to the case of 
correctly priced, riskless debt. It measures the extent to which the two markets are not integrated, 
in other words the difference between the pricing of debt and equity in equations (2) and (7) 
versus (8). If the markets are perfectly integrated, so that 1d , then the Modigliani and Miller 
theorem holds. If there is a separate low risk anomaly within each asset class, so that 1d , 
the effects are slightly smaller than in the riskless debt case. 
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D. Extension 2: Adding Government Subsidies 
The analysis so far considers situations where the government is not involved in insuring 
the debt of banks. Deposit insurance means that a bank can issue risky debt at the riskless rate of 
return. It means equation (3) for the pricing of debt can be modified to: 
fpdfpdi rrrrr   .  (11) 
For the bank, the result is something very similar to the riskless case, except that the debt, despite 
being priced as riskless, shares some of the risk of equity, mitigating the effect of the low risk 
anomaly on the cost of equity: 
WACC  e e*  A e,e*   rp A e,e*    e e*   A e,e*    rp  . (12) 
If pr , which is empirically not far from the estimates derived for  , then the effect on bank 
cost of capital is the same as it was in the riskless case. Again, there are two offsetting effects for 
the bank. As rp increases, the effect of leverage on the cost of capital is larger than in the riskless 
case. This is intuitive: lower leverage means that the bank gets a smaller subsidy from the 
government. There is less debt overall and the debt that remains requires a smaller subsidy. As   
increases in absolute value, the effect of leverage on the cost of capital is smaller than in the 
riskless case. This is because the impact of debt sharing in the risk of equity is magnified relative 
to the riskless case where there is no risk sharing.  
Another conclusion from equation (12) is that the government subsidy falls, of course, as 
capital increases, but there is an additional increase in the cost of capital that is not zero-sum 
between the government and banks, because their cost of equity capital increases. 
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E. Summary of the Calibration Exercise 
To sum up, as long as the debt and equity markets are not integrated, heightened capital 
markets will ceteris paribus increase the weighted average cost of capital for banks, in the 
presence of a low volatility anomaly. Table 9 summarizes the theoretical analysis. In every 
situation where capital markets are segmented, the basic effect is simply the product of the 
percentage point increase in equity capital times the excess risk-adjusted performance per unit of 
beta. Reasonable point estimates for these effects are in the range of 60 to 90 basis points, 
depending on whether we rely on the general pattern in all stocks or the experience of banks 
alone. These are attenuated in the case of risky debt or when there is a corresponding, but 
segmented low volatility anomaly in debt markets. But, we believe this attenuation is slight, in 
large part because bank debt betas overall are likely to be small. 
It is worth putting 60 and 90 basis points in comparative perspective. Recall that our asset 
beta estimate for banks was 0.074. With the historical risk premium, this suggests a pre-tax 
weighted average cost of capital under the CAPM of around 40 basis points per year above the 
risk-free rate over the same 40 year period. Relative to this spread, the effects of significantly 
heightened capital requirements when combined with the historical low volatility anomaly are 
large indeed. They suggest more than doubling the weighted average cost of capital, when it is 
measured as a premium over the risk-free rate. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Regulators and bankers are concerned about the effect of capital requirements on the cost 
of capital and lending rates.  Standard theory argues that this is naïve in perfect and efficient 
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capital markets, because increased capital will reduce the beta and thus the cost of equity, 
leaving the overall cost of capital unchanged.  
We find that this theory does not match the data on stock returns for banks.  While the 
evidence does show that less leverage reduces equity risk, this in turn puts the low risk anomaly 
into play.  In our sample, lower risk banks have the same or higher returns than higher risk 
banks.  Unless long-term and worldwide patterns are reversed, reducing equity beta will not 
reduce the cost of equity.  In a simple calibration that uses the historical pattern between risk and 
return, we find that a ten percentage-point increase in the required Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted 
assets ratio would have increased the overall cost of capital by as much as 90 basis points. Given 
the relatively low estimate for the beta of bank assets overall, this would more than double the 
spread of the cost of capital over the risk-free rate.  Alone or in concert with other cost-of-capital 
effects of heightened capital requirements, such as the loss of tax benefits in Kashap, Stein, and 
Hanson (2010), such an effect would put banks at a larger competitive disadvantage relative to 
the shadow banking system, provided it is not similarly regulated.12  
We repeat the qualification given in the introduction. When all other private and social 
costs and benefits are totaled up, heightened capital requirements may well remain desirable. Our 
contribution here is to point out that the low volatility anomaly presents an underappreciated and 
potentially significant cost that needs to be added to the debate.    
                                                            
12 See Adrian and Ashcraft (2012) for a broad overview of approaches to shadow banking regulation. 
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Figure 1. Pre-ranking Beta in the Banking Industry, Value-Weighted. Value-weighted pre-ranking beta, July 
1971 through December 2011. We define the banking industry as the union of the banking SIC codes from Ken 
French’s definition of 48 industries and the three-digit SIC 671, which includes bank holding companies. Pre-
ranking beta is computed by regressing a minimum of 24 months and a maximum of 60 months of trailing holding 
period returns (RET) on the corresponding CRSP value-weighted market holding period returns (VWRETD). The 
sample is divided into low (bottom 30%), medium (middle 40%), and high (top 30%) portfolios according to pre-
ranking beta. The sample includes firms for which we can compute a valid beta, with at least 24 monthly holding 
period return (RET) observations, a valid market capitalization, with a nonmissing price (PRC) and shares 
outstanding (SHROUT) observation, and at least one holding period return following a valid beta. 
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Figure 2. Bank Capital and Beta: Empirical Predictions. Exogenous changes in the inverse capital ratio on the x-
axis should be associated linearly with increases in equity beta if the changes in capital are exogenous and the debt 
is approximately risk free. The slope is equal to the asset beta. Endogenous leverage choice, where a bank chooses 
higher or lower leverage to match its asset beta risk, or risky debt will both tend to flatten the predicted relationship. 
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Figure 3. Kernel regressions of future beta on the inverse capital ratio. The dependent variable is the forward 
beta, computed by regressing a minimum of 24 months and a maximum of 60 months of future holding period 
returns (RET) in excess of the riskless rate on the corresponding CRSP value-weighted market holding period 
returns (VWRETD, also in excess of the riskless rate). The independent variable is the ratio of total risk-based 
capital (RCFD3792) to Tier 1 capital (RCFD8274). Panel A includes all banks. Panel B includes only banks above 
the median market capitalization in each month. The local polynomial regressions use a Epanechnikov kernel, with 
20 bins and smoothing interval of 0.1. 
Panel A. All banks 
 
Panel B. Large banks 
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Figure 4. Beta Sorted Portfolio Returns. Portfolio returns for low, medium, and high beta bank stocks. Each 
portfolio total return in excess of the riskless rate is computed using either equal or value weights. The sample is 
divided within each month into low (bottom 30%), medium (middle 40%), and high (top 30%) portfolios according 
to pre-ranking beta. Pre-ranking beta and the sample are described in Table 2. 
 
Panel A. Equal Weighted Portfolio 
 
 
Panel B. Value Weighted Portfolio 
  
  39
Figure 5. The Estimated Size of the Low Risk Anomaly in the Banking Industry. Plots of CAPM and Fama-
French 3-Factor alpha and beta for six portfolios. The alphas and betas are described in Table 6. Slopes from linear 
regressions of alpha on beta are shown on the plots. Panel A shows the results for the banking industry as defined in 
Table 1. Panel B excludes the peak to trough periods in the middle bank portfolio from October 1989 through 
October 1990 and from January 2007 through February 2009. Excluding the periods of poor ex post performance 
increases the alpha estimates. 
Panel A. Banks 
 
Panel B. Banks, Excluding Two Crisis Periods 
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Figure 6. The Estimated Size of the Low Risk Anomaly for All Firms. Plots of CAPM and Fama-French 3-
Factor alpha and beta for six portfolios. The alphas and betas are estimated as in Table 6, but for all CRSP firms. 
Slopes from linear regressions of alpha on beta are shown on the plots. 
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Table 1. Banking Industry. Number of firms in each industry group by decade and overall, July 1971 through 
December 2011. We define the banking industry as the union of the banking SIC codes from Ken French’s data 
library definition of 48 industries and the three-digit SIC 671, which includes bank holding companies. The sample 
includes firms for which we can compute a valid beta, with at least 24 monthly holding period return (RET) 
observations, a valid market capitalization, with a nonmissing price (PRC) and shares outstanding (SHROUT) 
observation, and at least one holding period return following a valid beta. There are relatively few publicly traded 
banks in the first half of the CRSP sample, so we focus on the second half, using July 1971 as a start date. Table 8 
shows the full sample as a robustness check. 
 
  CRSP Firms 
SIC Code Industry 
1971-
1979 
1980-
1989 
1990-
1999 
2000-
2011 Total 
6000-6000 Depository institutions 0 0 1 2 3 
6020-6020 Commercial banks 1 213 465 334 597 
6021-6021 National commercial banks 0 4 51 144 165 
6022-6022 State banks - Fed Res System 13 30 76 229 276 
6023-6024 State banks - not Fed Res System 15 31 7 0 33 
6025-6025 National banks - Fed Res System 62 120 45 4 131 
6026-6026 National banks - not Fed Res System 0 1 2 0 2 
6027-6027 National banks, not FDIC 0 1 0 0 1 
6028-6029 Banks 1 1 7 46 48 
6030-6036 Savings institutions 0 142 463 427 674 
6040-6059 Other Banks 4 11 5 1 13 
6060-6062 Credit unions 0 0 10 1 10 
6120-6129 S&Ls 29 130 20 4 142 
6130-6139 Agricultural credit institutions 0 1 1 0 1 
6140-6149 Personal credit institutions (Beneficial) 23 21 47 40 92 
6150-6159 Business credit institutions 9 33 56 56 115 
6160-6169 Mortgage bankers 16 34 68 52 119 
6170-6179 Finance lessors 0 0 3 1 3 
6190-6199 Financial services 0 2 3 2 7 
6710-6719 Holding offices 315 852 968 182 1520 
 Total 485 1,394 1,786 1,316 3,952 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics: CRSP Data. Summary statistics by pre-ranking risk, July 1971 through December 
2011. We define the banking industry as the union of the banking SIC codes from Ken French’s definition of 48 
industries and the three-digit SIC 671, which includes bank holding companies. Pre-ranking beta is computed by 
regressing a minimum of 24 months and a maximum of 60 months of trailing holding period returns in excess of the 
riskless rate on the corresponding CRSP value-weighted market holding period returns (VWRETD, also in excess of 
the riskless rate). Pre-ranking root mean squared error uses the residuals from these regressions. In the first two 
panels, the sample is divided within each month into low (bottom 30%), medium (middle 40%), and high (top 30%) 
portfolios according to pre-ranking beta. The last panel sorts by RMSE. Market capitalization is equal to price 
(PRC) times shares outstanding (SHROUT). Book-to-market ratio is the ratio of book equity to market 
capitalization. Book equity is computed as described in Ken French’s data library. The sample includes firms for 
which we can compute a valid beta, with at least 24 monthly holding period return (RET) observations, a valid 
market capitalization, with a nonmissing price (PRC) and shares outstanding (SHROUT) observation, and at least 
one holding period return following a valid beta.  
 
 Pre-Ranking Risk 
 N 
Bottom 
30% N 
Middle 
40% N 
Top 
30% 
Panel A. Means, Pre-Ranking Beta Sorts 
Pre-Ranking Beta 82,082 0.18 109,456 0.68 80,493 1.37 
   Decile 82,082 2.00 109,456 5.50 80,493 8.99 
Pre-Ranking Root Mean Squared Error (%) 82,082 8.05 109,456 8.37 80,493 10.94 
   Decile 82,082 4.69 109,456 5.15 80,493 6.69 
Market Capitalization ($M) 82,082 210.6 109,456 702.8 80,493 3,012.0 
Book-to-Market Ratio 54,356 1.39 86,643 1.87 66,955 3.63 
Return from t-12 through t-2 (%) 81,312 12.62 109,075 14.00 80,135 14.06 
Panel B. Medians, Pre-Ranking Beta Sorts 
Pre-Ranking Beta  0.21  0.67  1.27 
   Decile  2.00  5.00  9.00 
Pre-Ranking Root Mean Squared Error (%)  6.89  7.35  9.43 
   Decile  4.00  5.00  7.00 
Market Capitalization  47.3  95.8  196.1 
Book-to-Market Ratio  0.76  0.76  0.76 
Return from t-12 through t-2 (%)  8.86  11.11  10.29 
Panel C. Means, Pre-Ranking RMSE Sorts 
Pre-Ranking Beta 82,420 0.56 109,288 0.71 80,323 0.95 
   Decile 82,420 4.52 109,288 5.45 80,323 6.50 
Pre-Ranking Root Mean Squared Error (%) 82,420 5.39 109,288 7.94 80,323 14.26 
   Decile 82,420 2.00 109,288 5.50 80,323 8.99 
Market Capitalization ($M) 82,420 2,172.5 109,288 1,141.1 80,323 409.5 
Book-to-Market Ratio 66,126 1.77 84,061 2.23 57,767 3.04 
Return from t-12 through t-2 (%) 82,048 13.52 108,730 14.00 79,744 13.14 
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Table 3. Realized Portfolio Beta and Bank Capital. Portfolio betas by capital adequacy decile, March 1996 
through February 2011. The sample is divided within each month into ten decile portfolios according to capital.  
Each portfolio total return in excess of the riskless rate is computed using either equal or value weights. The first 
two columns use the ratio of total equity capital (RCFD3210) divided by average total assets (RCFD3368). The 
second two columns use Tier 1 capital (RCFD8274) in place of total equity capital. The third two columns use total 
risk-based capital (RCFD3792) in place of total equity capital. The fourth and fifth pairs of columns use total risk-
weighted assets (RCFDa223) in place of average total assets. The sample runs from March 1996, the first date where 
RCFD8274 is available, through February 2011. It includes 74,105 firm-months for which we can compute capital 
ratios from the Federal Reserve Bank, a valid market capitalization, with a nonmissing price (PRC) and shares 
outstanding (SHROUT) observation, and at least one holding period return following a valid capital ratio. 
 
Decile 
Sorts 
By: Equity to Assets 
Tier 1 Capital to 
Assets 
Risk-Based 
Capital to Assets 
Tier 1 Capital to 
Risk-Weighted 
Assets 
Risk-Based Capital 
to Risk-Weighted 
Assets 
 EW VW EW VW EW VW EW VW EW VW 
Panel A. Capital Adequacy (%), Decile Median and Value-Weighted Mean 
1 6.58 6.58 6.15 6.27 7.02 6.78 8.24 8.16 10.26 10.45 
2 7.54 7.60 6.84 6.85 7.81 8.05 9.30 9.30 10.79 10.91 
3 8.05 8.03 7.23 7.27 8.27 8.44 9.77 9.85 11.17 11.23 
4 8.46 8.66 7.55 7.55 8.62 8.74 10.17 10.30 11.54 11.55 
5 8.82 8.92 7.88 7.87 8.94 9.03 10.61 10.83 11.93 12.00 
6 9.19 9.25 8.21 8.24 9.27 9.39 11.11 11.29 12.41 12.38 
7 9.64 9.94 8.59 8.66 9.67 9.73 11.70 11.90 12.98 13.01 
8 10.17 10.74 9.09 9.05 10.16 10.19 12.51 12.60 13.77 13.70 
9 11.00 10.92 9.81 9.95 10.87 10.78 13.94 14.02 15.18 15.17 
10 13.24 15.26 11.45 14.33 12.51 13.74 17.26 18.36 18.45 19.82 
10-1 6.66 8.68 5.29 8.06 5.48 6.96 9.02 10.20 8.20 9.37 
Panel B. Realized Portfolio Beta, Equal and Value-Weighted Decile Portfolios 
1 0.80 1.20 0.86 1.35 0.78 0.97 0.93 1.24 0.76 0.80 
2 0.65 1.18 0.74 1.12 0.64 0.88 0.82 1.16 0.75 0.89 
3 0.60 0.78 0.68 0.95 0.65 1.04 0.67 1.29 0.71 1.00 
4 0.65 1.04 0.67 0.92 0.65 1.19 0.66 1.11 0.70 1.11 
5 0.70 1.11 0.66 1.05 0.64 1.12 0.63 0.96 0.67 1.06 
6 0.70 1.05 0.69 1.12 0.68 1.07 0.69 0.98 0.73 1.19 
7 0.66 1.26 0.60 1.00 0.63 1.16 0.61 0.76 0.64 1.14 
8 0.59 1.19 0.64 1.02 0.63 1.10 0.63 0.92 0.64 1.14 
9 0.66 1.03 0.54 0.81 0.71 1.23 0.50 1.08 0.55 1.03 
10 0.63 1.23 0.57 1.24 0.63 1.27 0.50 0.91 0.49 0.96 
10-1 -0.18 0.03 -0.28 -0.11 -0.15 0.30 -0.43 -0.34 -0.26 0.16 
Panel C. T-Stats for Panel B 
10-1 [-1.8] [0.3] [-2.8] [-1.1] [-1.6] [3.3] [-4.0] [-3.6] [-2.5] [1.5] 
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Table 4. Bank Capital and Forward Systematic and Idiosyncratic Risk. Regressions of forward beta or 
idiosyncratic risk on measures of bank capital. The dependent variable in Panels A and B is the forward beta, 
computed by regressing a minimum of 24 months and a maximum of 60 months of trailing holding period returns in 
excess of the riskless rate on the corresponding CRSP value-weighted market holding period returns (VWRETD, 
also in excess of the riskless rate). The dependent variable in Panels C and D is the root mean squared residual from 
these regressions. Both are Winsorized at 1% and 99%. The first two columns use the ratio of total equity capital 
(RCFD3210) divided by average total assets (RCFD3368) as the independent variable. The second two columns use 
Tier 1 capital (RCFD8274) in place of total equity capital. The third two columns use total risk-based capital 
(RCFD3792) in place of total equity capital. The fourth and fifth pairs of columns use total risk-weighted assets 
(RCFDa223) in place of average total assets. The sample runs from March 1996, the first date where RCFD8274 is 
available, through December 2010. The last forward beta that we can compute is in December 2010, using CRSP 
data through December 2012. 
 
 
Equity to Assets 
Tier 1 Capital 
to Assets 
Risk-Based 
Capital to 
Assets 
Tier 1 Capital 
to Risk-
Weighted 
Assets 
Risk-Based 
Capital to 
Risk-Weighted 
Assets 
 Coef [T] Coef [T] Coef [T] Coef [T] Coef [T] 
Panel A: Fama-MacBeth, Dependent Variable is Forward Beta 
Inverse Capital Ratio 0.011 [5.8] 0.031 [20.8] 0.011 [9.2] 0.058 [27.4] 0.056 [23.5] 
Intercept 0.549 [18.6] 0.297 [12.4] 0.560 [31.3] 0.160 [7.2] 0.234 [11.2] 
Observations  59,316  59,316  59,316  59,316  59,316 
T  178  178  178  178  178 
Average R-Squared  0.015  0.032  0.006  0.072  0.036 
Panel B: Pooled with 2D Clustering, Dependent Variable is Forward Beta 
Inverse Capital Ratio -0.011 [-1.5] 0.019 [2.9] -0.003 [-0.4] 0.058 [8.0] 0.057 [5.9] 
Intercept 0.802 [9.6] 0.442 [5.3] 0.714 [7.5] 0.154 [2.3] 0.225 [2.8] 
Observations  59,316  59,316  59,316  59,316  59,316 
Average R-Squared  0.002  0.007  0.000  0.045  0.023 
Panel C: Fama-MacBeth, Dependent Variable is Forward RMSE (%) 
Inverse Capital Ratio 0.160 [7.7] 0.010 [0.5] 0.032 [1.2] 0.332 [11.0] 0.603 [13.4] 
Intercept 7.669 [22.6] 9.318 [24.5] 9.078 [20.9] 6.462 [27.5] 4.656 [15.7] 
Observations  59,316  59,316  59,316  59,316  59,316 
T  178  178  178  178  178 
Average R-Squared  0.028  0.013  0.019  0.024  0.036 
Panel D: Pooled with 2D Clustering, Dependent Variable is Forward RMSE (%) 
Inverse Capital Ratio -0.059 [-0.8] -0.103 [-1.6] -0.091 [-1.1] 0.363 [4.6] 0.678 [6.3] 
Intercept 10.101 [11.0] 10.720 [12.4] 10.436 [10.9] 6.176 [9.3] 4.061 [5.2] 
Observations  59,316  59,316  59,316  59,316  59,316 
Average R-Squared  0.001  0.002  0.001  0.017  0.030 
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Table 5. Returns and Beta: Fama-MacBeth Regressions. Regressions of excess returns on pre-ranking beta 
deciles. Pre-ranking beta, market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, past returns, and the sample are described in 
Table 2. 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Excess Return (Basis Points) Univariate Multivariate 
 Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] 
Pre-Ranking Beta Decile -0.5 [-0.19] 0.8 [0.33] 
Log (Market Capitalization ($M))   -2.1 [-0.45] 
Book-to-Market Ratio Decile   11.4 [5.95] 
Return from t-12 through t-2 (%) Decile   15.3 [6.72] 
Intercept 63.9 [3.98] -65.4 [-1.05] 
Observations  272,031  207,267 
T  486  486 
Average R-Squared  0.0203  0.0676 
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Table 6. Realized Returns and Risk: Beta Portfolios. Regressions of portfolio returns on market excess returns 
and the Fama-French factors, SMB and HML. Each portfolio total return in excess of the riskless rate is computed 
using either equal or value weights. The sample is divided within each month into low (bottom 30%), medium 
(middle 40%), and high (top 30%) portfolios according to pre-ranking beta. Pre-ranking beta and the sample are 
described in Table 2. 
 
Panel A. Equal Weighted 
 Bottom 30% Middle 40% Top 30% Top – Bottom 
Basis Points Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] 
Mean Excess Returns 
 59.1 [3.42] 65.0 [2.90] 58.2 [1.93] -0.9 [-0.05] 
CAPM Regressions 
Market 0.56 [18.91] 0.81 [23.51] 1.14 [26.15] 0.59 [17.67] 
Intercept 33.6 [2.55] 28.0 [1.82] 5.9 [0.30] -27.7 [-1.86] 
T  486  486  486  486 
R-Squared  0.425  0.533  0.586  0.392 
Fama-French 3-Factor Regressions 
Market 0.55 [21.59] 0.80 [28.96] 1.15 [32.29] 0.60 [18.63] 
SMB 0.38 [10.46] 0.47 [11.74] 0.52 [10.24] 0.14 [3.08] 
HML 0.46 [12.04] 0.65 [15.50] 0.89 [16.48] 0.43 [8.71] 
Intercept 9.1 [0.82] -5.6 [-0.45] -38.3 [-2.44] -47.4 [-3.33] 
T  486  486  486  486 
R-Squared  0.602  0.716  0.743  0.460 
 
Panel B. Value Weighted 
 Bottom 30% Middle 40% Top 30% Top – Bottom 
Basis Points Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] 
Mean Excess Returns 
 52.2 [2.37] 56.1 [2.31] 36.4 [1.21] -15.8 [-0.71] 
CAPM Regressions 
Market 0.71 [19.17] 0.95 [28.87] 1.27 [35.73] 0.55 [12.93] 
Intercept 19.6 [1.17] 12.4 [0.84] -21.6 [-1.36] -41.2 [-2.14] 
T  486  486  486  486 
R-Squared  0.432  0.633  0.725  0.257 
Fama-French 3-Factor Regressions 
Market 0.72 [19.78] 1.00 [31.46] 1.32 [38.74] 0.60 [13.90] 
SMB 0.20 [3.78] -0.03 [-0.58] -0.13 [-2.62] -0.33 [-5.24] 
HML 0.46 [8.33] 0.59 [12.35] 0.69 [13.41] 0.23 [3.57] 
Intercept -1.9 [-0.12] -11.5 [-0.83] -47.9 [-3.18] -46.0 [-2.41] 
T  486  486  486  486 
R-Squared  0.492  0.684  0.762  0.291 
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Table 7. Realized Returns and Risk: Idiosyncratic Risk Portfolios. Regressions of portfolio returns on market 
excess returns and the Fama-French factors, SMB and HML. Each portfolio total return in excess of the riskless rate 
is computed using either equal or value weights. The sample is divided within each month into low (bottom 30%), 
medium (middle 40%), and high (top 30%) portfolios according to pre-ranking root mean squared error. Pre-ranking 
root mean squared error and the sample are described in Table 2. 
 
Panel A. Equal Weighted 
 Bottom 30% Middle 40% Top 30% Top – Bottom 
Basis Points Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] 
Mean Excess Returns 
 70.8 [4.23] 67.6 [3.05] 42.6 [1.35] -28.1 [-1.34] 
CAPM Regressions 
Market 0.64 [27.31] 0.82 [25.24] 1.03 [19.50] 0.39 [9.02] 
Intercept 41.3 [3.92] 29.9 [2.04] -4.8 [-0.20] -46.1 [-2.36] 
T  486  486  486  486 
R-Squared  0.607  0.568  0.440  0.144 
Fama-French 3-Factor Regressions 
Market 0.65 [29.55] 0.82 [31.52] 1.02 [24.28] 0.38 [9.95] 
SMB 0.17 [5.35] 0.43 [11.32] 0.80 [13.23] 0.63 [11.61] 
HML 0.42 [12.70] 0.67 [16.92] 0.91 [14.24] 0.49 [8.50] 
Intercept 22.0 [2.28] -3.8 [-0.33] -54.3 [-2.92] -76.3 [-4.56] 
T  486  486  486  486 
R-Squared  0.682  0.741  0.670  0.393 
 
Panel B. Value Weighted 
 Bottom 30% Middle 40% Top 30% Top – Bottom 
Basis Points Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] 
Mean Excess Returns 
 55.7 [2.26] 43.8 [1.56] 49.4 [1.42] -6.3 [-0.29] 
CAPM Regressions 
Market 1.02 [34.23] 1.16 [33.62] 1.32 [26.40] 0.30 [6.30] 
Intercept 8.9 [0.66] -9.2 [-0.60] -11.0 [-0.49] -19.8 [-0.94] 
T  486  486  486  486 
R-Squared  0.708  0.700  0.590  0.076 
Fama-French 3-Factor Regressions 
Market 1.08 [37.65] 1.21 [38.06] 1.34 [29.36] 0.26 [6.00] 
SMB -0.27 [-6.60] -0.03 [-0.69] 0.34 [5.20] 0.62 [9.86] 
HML 0.51 [11.67] 0.71 [14.72] 0.87 [12.57] 0.36 [5.52] 
Intercept -7.9 [-0.62] -38.1 [-2.71] -51.7 [-2.56] -43.9 [-2.29] 
T  486  486  486  486 
R-Squared  0.747  0.760  0.679  0.263 
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Table 8. Realized Returns and Risk: Robustness. Regressions of portfolio returns on market excess returns and the Fama-French factors, SMB and HML. 
Each portfolio total return in excess of the riskless rate is computed using either equal or value weights. The sample is divided within each month into low 
(bottom 30%), medium (middle 40%), and high (top 30%) portfolios according to pre-ranking beta or pre-ranking root mean squared error. Pre-ranking beta and 
root mean squared error and the sample are described in Table 2. All portfolios are value-weighted. The first four pairs of columns use only bank stocks, while 
the last two pairs of columns use the full CRSP sample. 
 
 
Beta: Top-Bottom, 
Bank Stocks, July 
1971-December 2011 
Beta: Top-Bottom, 
Bank Stocks, January 
1931-December 2011 
Idiosyncratic Risk: 
Top-Bottom, Bank 
Stocks, July 1971-
December 2011 
Idiosyncratic Risk: 
Top-Bottom, Bank 
Stocks, January 
1931-December 2011 
Beta: Top-Bottom, All 
Stocks, July 1971-
December 2011 
Beta: Top-Bottom, 
All Stocks,  
January 1931-
December 2011 
Basis Points Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] 
CAPM Regressions 
Market 0.55 [12.93] 0.74 [18.59] 0.30 [6.30] 0.50 [9.47] 0.71 [19.47] 0.80 [37.92] 
Intercept -41.2 [-2.14] -44.6 [-2.10] -19.8 [-0.94] -24.8 [-0.87] -37.7 [-2.32] -35.3 [-3.14] 
T  486  972  486  972  486  972 
R-Squared  0.257  0.263  0.076  0.085  0.439  0.597 
Fama-French 3-Factor Regressions 
Market 0.60 [13.90] 0.64 [15.75] 0.26 [6.00] 0.18 [3.58] 0.63 [18.66] 0.70 [34.42] 
SMB -0.33 [-5.24] -0.13 [-2.05] 0.62 [9.86] 1.04 [13.05] 0.25 [5.19] 0.35 [10.69] 
HML 0.23 [3.57] 0.56 [9.73] 0.36 [5.52] 0.61 [8.51] -0.17 [-3.23] 0.15 [5.30] 
Intercept -46.0 [-2.41] -58.3 [-2.84] -43.9 [-2.29] -61.2 [-2.41] -32.3 [-2.16] -46.1 [-4.49] 
T  486  972  486  972  486  972 
R-Squared  0.291  0.320  0.263  0.273  0.540  0.671 
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Table 9. Theoretical Determinants of Changes in WACC. This table summarizes how the weighted average cost 
of capital depends on assumptions regarding the efficiency of the debt market, its integration with the equity market, 
and the existence of a government subsidy.  
 
Bank Debt 
Risk Pricing 
Integrated 
Markets Government Subsidy WACC 
Risky Correctly 
Priced 
No No 
Risk Free Correctly 
Priced 
No No 
Risky Low Risk 
Anomaly 
No No 
 
Risky Low Risk 
Anomaly 
 = d 
No No 
 
Risky or 
Risk Free 
Low Risk 
Anomaly 
 = d 
Yes 
 
No 0 
Risky Correctly 
Priced 
No Yes 
 
 
 
  
  ** ,eeAee 
 *ee 
     ddd eeAee   ** ,
  dee   1*
1d
    preeAee   ** ,
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Appendix: Sample Bank Data. Example beta, RMSE, and Tier 1 capital ratio for select large and small 
capitalization banks as of December 2011. The first panel lists banks with greater than $5 billion in market 
capitalization. The second panel lists banks with market capitalization between $75 and $125 million. Pre-ranking 
beta is computed by regressing a minimum of 24 months and a maximum of 60 months of trailing holding period 
returns in excess of the riskless rate on the corresponding CRSP value-weighted market holding period returns 
(VWRETD, also in excess of the riskless rate). Pre-ranking root mean squared error uses the residuals from these 
regressions. The first measure of capital adequacy is the ratio of total equity capital (RCFD3210) divided by average 
total assets (RCFD3368). The second replaces Tier 1 capital (RCFD8274) in place of total equity capital and uses 
total risk-weighted assets (RCFDa223) in place of average total assets. The third uses total risk-based capital 
(RCFD3792) in place of total equity capital.  
 
  Risk Capital Adequacy (%) 
Bank Name 
Market 
Cap Beta
RMSE 
(%)
Equity 
to 
Assets 
Tier 1 
Capital 
to Risk-
Weighted 
Assets 
Risk-
Based 
Capital 
to Risk-
Weighted 
Assets
Panel A. Large Capitalization Banks, Over $5 Billion 
CITIGROUP INC 122,000 2.42 14.52 11.20 15.09 16.91 
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 9,516 2.13 15.79 14.34 13.18 15.17 
BANK OF AMERICA CORP 110,400 2.01 14.26 11.40 11.54 14.73 
AMERICAN EXPRESS CO 52,027 1.91 11.00 19.22 18.26 19.53 
CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP 17,011 1.65 11.73 15.29 11.94 16.31 
STATE STREET CORP 21,687 1.31 8.70 10.80 18.14 19.99 
WELLS FARGO & CO NEW 142,800 1.28 10.37 11.20 10.40 13.36 
GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC 79,825 1.24 8.46 19.22 18.87 23.94 
SUNTRUST BANKS INC 11,679 1.19 11.79 11.94 10.05 12.58 
P N C FINANCIAL SERVICES GRP INC 28,314 1.14 8.82 15.41 12.18 15.49 
MORGAN STANLEY DEAN WITTER & CO 37,005 1.14 12.26 12.17 16.70 19.49 
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO 146,200 1.08 8.06 8.40 9.71 13.59 
REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP NEW 6,758 1.01 13.27 11.92 11.68 14.93 
COMERICA INC 6,440 0.99 8.03 11.04 10.27 14.29 
U S BANCORP DEL 45,617 0.94 7.66 10.34 9.30 12.72 
B B & T CORP 16,095 0.87 10.79 11.23 13.02 15.48 
NORTHERN TRUST CORP 12,182 0.76 6.22 9.14 13.12 15.72 
M & T BANK CORP 9,187 0.69 8.62 13.24 8.82 12.43 
NEW YORK COMMUNITY BANCORP INC 7,318 0.68 6.57 14.40 13.51 14.18 
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORP 33,480 0.61 6.36 9.68 12.14 15.76 
KEYCORP NEW 6,630 0.53 11.16 10.54 12.41 16.52 
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  Risk Capital Adequacy (%) 
Bank Name 
Market 
Cap Beta
RMSE 
(%)
Equity 
to 
Assets 
Tier 1 
Capital 
to Risk-
Weighted 
Assets 
Risk-
Based 
Capital 
to Risk-
Weighted 
Assets
Panel B. Small Capitalization Banks, $75 to $125 Million 
HERITAGE COMMERCE CORP 97 1.54 15.61 13.06 16.83 18.10 
FIRST BANCORP P R 77 1.05 19.07 7.63 10.28 11.57 
NORTHRIM BANCORP INC 121 1.02 7.68 11.94 13.11 14.36 
HERITAGE OAKS BANCORP 83 1.01 10.57 12.70 13.47 14.75 
HORIZON BANCORP IND 84 0.90 8.40 9.40 12.70 13.95 
ENCORE BANCSHRES INC 108 0.79 17.11 10.33 11.78 13.04 
SOUTHERN NATIONAL BANCORP VA INC 85 0.76 9.86 15.82 19.74 20.99 
MIDDLEBURG FINANCIAL CORP 97 0.70 7.74 8.40 12.28 13.54 
MIDWESTONE FINANCIAL GRP INC NEW 124 0.68 11.79 9.61 11.96 13.21 
ENTERPRISE BANCORP INC 106 0.62 6.77 9.04 10.11 11.42 
BAR HARBOR BANKSHARES 104 0.62 5.25 9.38 13.72 15.56 
N B & T FINANCIAL GROUP INC 78 0.60 5.28 10.30 15.44 16.31 
MONROE BANCORP 76 0.58 20.92 8.28 12.44 13.71 
PORTER BANCORP INC 121 0.56 9.05 11.30 12.79 14.72 
B N C BANCORP 80 0.53 7.53 8.34 11.19 13.01 
PREFERRED BANK LOS ANGELES 105 0.43 15.39 10.69 13.75 15.02 
OHIO VALLEY BANC CORP 78 0.38 7.62 8.71 12.16 13.41 
CHICOPEE BANCORP INC 76 0.32 3.27 13.35 16.14 17.11 
WILBER CORP 100 0.28 11.38 8.29 13.22 14.48 
B C B BANCORP INC 88 0.26 4.98 9.16 14.95 15.89 
NORWOOD FINANCIAL CORP 78 0.18 5.26 12.35 17.94 19.23 
CITIZENS HOLDING CO 87 0.17 8.90 8.96 14.82 16.07 
CENTURY BANCORP INC 85 0.15 8.36 6.23 12.43 13.61 
UNION BANKSHARES INC 80 0.15 4.25 9.21 13.90 15.10 
HINGHAM INSTITUTION FOR SVGS MA 89 0.04 4.72 7.20 11.61 12.72 
 
 
 
